January 2018

A European Pensions Union: Towards a Strengthening of the European Pension Systems

By Pascal Borsjé (Clifford Chance LLP) & Hans van Meerten (Utrecht University - Utrecht Centre for Shared Regulation and Enforcement in Europe – RENFORCE) This contribution will especially address the EC’s general policy in respect of the IORP II Proposal, also in connection with general more recent EU law developments, and its consequences for the pension systems of the EU Member States, with a focus on the occupational pension system of the Netherlands. (more…)

Eurasian Economic Perspectives: Proceedings of the 20th Eurasia Business and Economics Society Conference

By Mehmet Huseyin Bilgin,‎ Hakan Danis,‎ Ender Demir & Ugur Can This volume presents selected papers on recent management research from the 20th Eurasia Business and Economics Society (EBES) Conference, which was held in Vienna in 2016. Its primary goal is to showcase advances in the fields of public economics, regional studies, economic development and inequality, and economic policy-making. Reflecting the contemporary political climate, many of the articles address the effectiveness, relevance and impact of European Union policies. In addition,...

March 2017

Towards an Equitable and Sustainable Points System: A Proposal for Pension Reform in Belgium

By Erik Schokkaert (Catholic University of Leuven), Pierre Devolder (Catholic University of Louvain), Jean Hindriks (University of London) & Frank Vandenbroucke (University of Amsterdam) We describe the points system that has been proposed by the Belgian Commission for Pension Reform 2020-2040. Intragenerational equity can be realised in a flexible and transparent way through the allocation of points within a cohort. The intergenerational distribution is determined by fixing the value of a point for the newly retired and a sustainability parameter...

Pensions and Sovereign Default

By Sean Myers (Stanford University) This paper studies the effect of public pension obligations on a government's decision to default. In the model, the government can renege on its pension promises but suffers a cost from losing the trust of households about future pensions. Large pension promises act as a commitment device for debt because they require the government to have regular access to credit markets. The government's decision to default is driven by its total obligations, not just its...